…the criteria of the political…is the friend/enemy discrimination. It deals with the formation of a 'we' as opposed to a 'they' and is always concerned with collective forms of identification; it has to do with conflict and antagonism and is therefore the realm of decision, not free discussion. (Mouffe 2005, 11) What is crucial for us here is to understand freedom itself as political and not as a purpose…to be obtained by political means, and to realise that coercion and brute force are always a means for protecting or establishing or expanding political space, but in and of themselves are definitely not political. (Arendt 2005, 130) In a 1990 article in Political Theory, Michael Walzer wrote that, like the fashion for pleated trousers in the 1980s, the communitarian critique of liberalism is transient but certain to return. 1 Walzer attributes the transience of communitarianism to the fact that it cannot provide an alternative to liberalism but only a corrective to certain problematic tendencies within it toward instability, disassociation and depoliticisation. Liberals are now widely understood to have won the debate with their communitarian critics of the 1980s due to liberalism's accommodation of communitarian concerns within autonomy-based theories such as Will Kymlicka's (1989) . However, what Walzer calls 'standard liberalism' did not emerge from this controversy unchanged. Rather, in challenging liberalism's bifurcation and privileging of morality over ethics, reason over history and, generally, philosophy over politics, the communitarian critique succeeded in pushing liberalism in a more political direction. This was apparent in the development of John Rawls' (1993) work and in the shift of interest among political theorists from justice to democracy and from rights to deliberation in the 1990s. In this review article, I draw out the commonalities and differences among these three agonistic critics of liberalism according to three inter-related themes: the meaning of politics and the nature of 'the political', the significance of conflict and passion in political life, and the constitution of political community. In doing so, I suggest that, like the communitarian critique of liberalism, the current agonistic critique of dialogical liberalism is likely to be transient but certain to return. The transience of the agonistic critique, however, is not due to its dependence on the liberal paradigm. Rather it arises from a difficulty inherent in praxis philosophy itself: the problem of conceptualising political action independently of its institutional representation, which leads Sheldon Wolin (1996) , for instance, to characterise democracy as 'fugitive'.
There is a parallel difficulty between the challenge of radical political action and its philosophical articulation. At the political level, the challenge is how to stage resistance to the current hegemonic order in a way that does not reinforce the institutions it seeks to overthrow; at the philosophical level, the challenge is to articulate a critique that resists being appropriated as a further development of the ideology it interrogates. In this context, to describe the current preoccupation with agonism in contemporary political theory as a corrective to dialogical liberalism would be to surrender too much. 3 For, as Bonnie Honig observes 4 , 'the corrective view is a liberal strategy -it is how liberalism treats all its critics, and that is why it is hegemonic'.
The ethical-political significance of dissensus
All three books reviewed here are centrally concerned with political conflict and attribute to it a certain ethical significance. Each book also provides a restatement and elaboration of ideas first published in the 1990s during which the agonistic critique of liberalism superceded the communitarian one. Walzer's intention in writing (Walzer 1973 (Walzer , 1981 Neither Arendt nor Walzer distinguish between politics and the political. However this distinction is increasingly drawn in contemporary political theory and it is one on which Mouffe explicitly relies. According to Mouffe, whereas political science inquires into the facts of politics with its manifold practices and conflicts, political theory is concerned with the political, which refers to the 'way in which society is instituted' (9), the symbolic unity in terms of which conflict is represented as social. As such, political theory is fundamentally concerned with those universal concepts such as human rights and popular sovereignty in relation to which a society reflexively constitutes its self.
'The political' is understood to be autonomous in the sense that the terms in which social conflict is represented are seen to be (at least potentially) a product of self-conscious human activity or politics. While politics is not everything (there is no control centre from which society might be governed), everything is political (because the terms in which society is ordered are contingent they are contestable) (Mouffe 2005: 17- between enemies as such but to the intensification in which the distinction between friend and enemy is meaningful. The political is said to be autonomous (e.g. of economics, morality, etc.) in that its guiding distinction is independent of other criteria such as the moral distinction between right and wrong or the juridical distinction between legal and illegal (Schmitt 1996, 26-27 The most important insight of Schmitt, according to Mouffe, is that in demonstrating that 'every consensus is based on acts of exclusion' he reveals 'the impossibility of a fully inclusive 'rational' consensus' (11). In other words, the anticipated moral consensus in terms of which free and equal citizens are supposed to represent their particular claims, according to dialogical liberalism, is always also politically constituted and therefore potentially ideological. In fact, politics always ultimately concerns the representation of public reason, which delineates the terms in which deliberation is carried out by providing criteria for distinguishing the reasonable from the unreasonable. For Mouffe, the starting point for an adequate democratic theory therefore must be acknowledgement of the antagonistic dimension of politics since this brings the political nature of the terms of political discourse back into view.
As distinct from the 'the political', Mouffe takes politics to refer to 'the set of practices and institutions through which an order is In thinking 'with Schmitt against Schmitt' Mouffe wants to understand how the us/them distinction might work within the polity (e.g. in terms of Left and Right-wing political parties) to constitute plurality rather than viewing plurality as a necessary threat to the preservation of the political association or evidence of its decline. When formulated this way, the challenge for democracy no longer appears as how to overcome the we/they opposition (as Mouffe imputes to liberalism). Rather the problem is how to draw the distinction in a way that is 'compatible with the recognition of the pluralism which is constitutive of modern democracy' (14). In other words, the challenge for democracy is to accommodate dissensus without either assimilating it within the terms of an anticipated moral (liberal) consensus (Habermas) or denying its legitimacy in the name of political unity (Schmitt) . Given Schmitt's collaboration with the Nazi regime, however, it is reasonable to wonder whether it is possible to appropriate Schmitt for a radical theory of democracy as Mouffe wants to or whether, rather, it is necessary to 'think against' Schmitt from within a different set of presuppositions and guiding concerns (but see Kalyvas 2000) . There are at least two grounds on which the Schmittian conception of the political appears inadequate to the task. First, at the empirical level, it seems doubtful whether every political identity is necessarily constituted in contrast to an antagonist. While this certainly is often the case, it is similarly plausible that an identity might sometimes emerge reflexively out of cooperation or conflict that is shared by those who are party to it, for example, through a struggle for recognition. Second, and related to this, Mouffe's hope to employ the Schmittian conception of the political in a way that is compatible with plurality appears problematic unless it can account for the emergence of more than two perspectives out of a conflict that is initially dichotomous. But In this context, Arendt insists that the meaning of politics is freedom (108). Yet, she observes, this classical understanding of politics seems to be contradicted by the experience of totalitarianism and the threat of nuclear war. Whereas the politicisation of all aspects of life under totalitarianism confirms the liberal prejudice that freedom begins where politics ends, the development of the atomic bomb leads to the hope that politics might be dispensed with entirely before it destroys all life on earth.
Both experiences deprive liberal theory of its instrumental justification of politics: if politics is only a necessary evil for protecting life and yet politics itself constitutes the greatest threat to human life in modernity, then modern politics is indeed in danger of being meaningless (110).
Yet, Arendt argues, the widespread sense of the meaningless of politics is actually a consequence of our modern prejudices against politics, which she aims to dispel by exposing their historical contingency (152-153). The first prejudice that obscures our view of politics is that it is a universal aspect of the human condition that comes about wherever people live together. For the Greeks, on the contrary, politics exists only where there is a polis, a space within which people who have liberated themselves from the necessities of life are free to inter-act with their equals without compulsion, force or rule. When understood in these terms politics is by no means a necessity but in fact 'has existed so rarely and in so few places that, historically speaking, only a few great epochs have known it and turned it into a reality' (119).
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The second prejudice that obscures our view of politics is that it can be meaningful only in terms of some higher non-political end. If the problem with appropriating a Schmittian conception of the political for a theory of radical democracy is how to employ it in a way constitutive of plurality, then, the problem with appropriating an Arendtian conception of the political is how to employ it in a way that politicises social inequality. This, arguably, is precisely what Sheldon Wolin (1990; does by distinguishing between politics and the political where Arendt fails to. For Wolin (1996: 31) the political refers to the 'idea that a free society composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public deliberations, power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity'. In contrast, politics refers to 'the legitimised and public contestation, primarily by organised and unequal social powers, over access to the resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity'. Against Arendt's reduction of all purposive action to the anti-political mentality of fabrication, this distinction allows Walzer's list of non-deliberative activities directed against social inequality to be recognised as politics (what else could they be?). Moreover it reserves the concept of 'the political' to be employed in the ethical sense developed by Arendt: as referring to the principle of freedom in terms of which political struggle is might come to be understood by the parties to a conflict as communal.
Agonism as sublimation of antagonism
The virtue of Walzer's account of non-deliberative politics is that it lends substance to debates about agonism in political theory, which are often highly abstract. We are now in a position to understand these activities as the stuff of ordinary politics, which is transacted Mouffe understands agonism to be distinct both from selfinterested negotiation based on aggregating individual preferences and from rational deliberation oriented to consensus. While the former reduces politics to economics the latter reduces it to ethics.
In contrast agonistic adversaries view their conflict as concerning the symbolic unity in terms of which their particular interests are represented and their contending claims are revealed to be irreconcilable (Mouffe 2005: 21) . (Gesturing to Rawls, we might think of this symbolic unity as an 'overlapping dissensus').
According to Mouffe (2005: 21) 'regulate' an agonistic conflict, which must fundamentally concern the procedures themselves.
Mouffe's agonism provides an important critical perspective from which to recognise the potentially ideological uses to which dialogical justifications of political regimes may be put insofar as they must represent political conflict as already communal.
However, her theory lacks an adequate account of the institutionalization of agonistic democracy and, in particular, how this would be possible without domesticating agonistic politics.
Having drawn attention to the potentially ideological function of ostensibly democratic institutions in regulating political conflict,
Mouffe cannot then rely (as she sometimes does) on a shared commitment to these same institutions in order to sublimate a potentially antagonistic confrontation between enemies into an agonistic contest between adversaries.
Agonism bound by law?
Arendt's discussion of agonism is more indirect and ambivalent than In Homer, the Greeks recognised that 'all things with two sides make their real appearance only in struggle ' (166) . The confrontation between Achilles and Hector, immortalised in The Illiad, exemplified the principle that it was only when confronted by an opponent and in the ensuing contest to be the best that individuals achieved excellence and disclosed who they were to the world. The achievement of the Athenians was to separate struggle from war and turn it into 'an integrating component of the polis and the political sphere' (172). Whereas the heroes of Homer's epics achieved greatness on the battlefield, the Athenians sought to create a space for politics in which such greatness might be revealed everyday in athletic competitions (which provided an opportunity for citizens to 'come together and admire a display of non-violent strength') and in oratorical contests (the 'never-ending verbal exchanges that took place within the polis itself') (166). In establishing a public space in which citizens could engage in argument about how the world appeared to them, this world was disclosed as common to them, first in its two-sidedness and then in terms of the plurality of perspectives that each individual brought to bear on it.
It is here that a decisive difference emerges between Mouffe's and Arendt's agonisim, which results directly from their different conceptions of the political. For Arendt, political agonism entails the clash between a plurality of perspectives that are brought to bear on the world by individuals. While plurality first makes its appearance in two-sidedness, however, a dichotomous view of the world is ultimately reductive of political reality; it is only where three or more perspectives come into play that genuine politics begins. As such, the Schmittian distinction between friend and enemy becomes anti-political to the extent that it prevents these other perspectives from emerging.
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Arendt's understanding of the political in terms of freedom thus enables her to recognise agonism as emerging out of the plurality based on the 'absolute difference of all men from one another, which is greater than the relative difference among peoples, nations, or races' (96). In contrast, Schmitt's understanding of the political in terms of exclusion means that agonism necessarily refers to a conflict between two opposing groups, which renders problematic from the outset Mouffe's ambition to employ it as a way of comprehending plurality within the polity. If consensus-oriented 10 Arendt might have had Schmitt in mind, for instance, when she wrote in The Human Condition that when people are 'only for or against other people', the world-disclosing potential of action is curtailed; for then 'speech becomes indeed "mere talk," simply one more means toward the end, whether it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody with propaganda; here words reveal nothing' (Arendt 1998: 180) .
dialogue is always suspected of being ideological, then how might conflict be democratically sublimated so that it comes to be understood as common to the opposing groups, a relation of agonism rather than antagonism? Surely it is only with the emergence of further perspectives that the representation of a conflict as an incommensurable one between two competing forms of life can be recast in ways that might enable political antagonists to understand themselves otherwise.
Yet Arendt recognises that even the highly individualistic agonism of the Greeks, which she cautiously endorses, is risky since it constantly threatens the political association. Indeed, the agonal spirit of the Greeks eventually brought their city-states to ruin since 'it made alliances between them well-nigh impossible and poisoned the domestic life of the citizens with envy and mutual hatred' (16).
The inadequacy of the Greek conception of politics was that the commonality of the political association was 'constituted only by the walls of the city and boundaries of its laws' rather than being experienced in terms of the web of human relationships that is revealed from a plurality of perspectives (16). While agonism is important for disclosing plurality, enabling the world to be perceived from its many sides, Arendt also recommends an ethic of care for this web of human relationships that emerges out of political interaction (see Canovan 1997; Schaap 2005, ch.4).
The promise of politics, as we have already seen is 'the political': the actualisation of freedom, the disclosure of commonness out of plurality. However, the capacity to begin anew, to set in train events over which we do not have control also threatens to tear the world apart. Politics, therefore, also stands in need of redemption by the human ability to forgive and to make promises. Significantly, however, these faculties were not recognised by the Greeks but appear rather in two principles of Roman 'foreign policy': namely, of sparing the vanquished and making treaties with their former enemies (178).
Arendt draws out this key difference between the Greeks and the Romans in terms of their contrasting conceptions of law.
Whereas, for the Greeks, law enabled politics by establishing a space within which citizens were free and equal, law itself was not political but rather pre-political; it was made rather than enacted.
As such, the founding law of the polity might be drafted by a foreigner just as an architect might be commissioned to design the city walls (179). While the Greeks understood that law was a necessary precondition for politics, since it served to delimit the space in which citizens could actualise their freedom, they viewed it as anti-political because they understood it as command.
For the Romans, in contrast, the founding of public law was the most fundamental of all political acts. Indeed, Rome's own founding law was not the work of one man but 'a contract between two warring factions, the patricians and the plebes, that required the approval of the entire populace' (179). The law did not unite the Romans by erasing the difference between them but rather established a lasting tie between them in the form of a contract. By viewing law in relational terms of promising the Romans were able to formulate a properly political concept of law as the 'institution of a relationship between conflictual sides of a pluralistic interaction' (Taminiaux 2000, 176) .
For the Romans, the natural pursuit of every war is a treaty or alliance rather than the destruction of one's enemy. As such every peace treaty 'is concerned with a new ordering of things as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities but also of the new thing that made its appearance in the course of hostilities and is shared by both doers and sufferers' (177). As such, Arendt argues, the Romans discovered politics 'at the very place where it had reached its limits and come to an end among the Greeks' (178).
Whereas for the Greeks, politics was possible only among citizens of equal rank within the city walls, for the Romans politics grew 'between alien and unequally matched people who first came together in battle' (178). While the political existence of the Greeks was founded in struggle and war, this came about in the Schmittian way: they came to identify themselves as a "we" in opposition to a shared enemy and then 'came together to preserve their own nature' (178). For the Romans, in contrast, 'this same struggle became the means by which they recognised both themselves and their opponents' (178). By making a treaty with their enemies rather than annihilating them, the Romans expanded political space so that a new world could arise between the two peoples brought together by war. A treaty could guarantee 'the continuation of a new world that they share in common, which arose out of their meeting in battle, where deeds and suffering brought forth one and the same thing' (178).
As with Arendt's distinction between the 'good' American and 'bad' French revolutions, there seems to be something ideological at work in her contrast between the Greek and Roman conceptions of law and foreign policy. 11 In particular, Arendt elides the extent to which Roman treaty-making was imperialistic and backed by the threat of total destruction. As with her work on revolution, what is most interesting in Arendt, however, is the ambiguity in her endorsement of the Greek and Roman conceptions of law as command and relation, respectively. While ostensibly affirming the Roman conception against the Greek, the dichotomy she constructs 11 For instance she passes lightly over the annihilation of Carthage by the Romans, which they understood to be justified because Carthage posed a mortal threat to Rome. As Keith Breen points out (personal correspondence 8 February 2006), this suggests that the Romans' distinguished between different categories of enemies: in Mouffe's terms those who could become adversaries united by law and those who would remain antagonists to be destroyed.
breaks down elsewhere in her work so that law appears more ambiguously as both command and relation. As such, the space for freedom that law delimits is founded both in the promise of inclusion and an act of violent appropriation, as both 'giving' and 'taking' as Hans Lindahl (forthcoming) puts it.
The agonistic critique of dialogical liberalism is unavoidably On the one hand, to require it to do so would already be to represent it in liberalism's own terms such that the most it could amount to would be a 'correction' of a hegemonic discourse. On the other hand, however, without an adequate conceptualization of the implication of an agonistic politics for democratic institutions, agonistic theories of democracy can be too easily dismissed as failing to offer a real alternative to dialogical liberalism. While
Arendt by no means develops a full-blown theory of democratic institutions, her intriguing discussion of the Greek and Roman conceptions of law in The Promise of Politics might provide a valuable starting point from which theorists of agonistic politics might begin to do so. 12 
